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Abstract: The fundamental base underlying scientific empirical principles is currently at 
high risk of collapse or extinction. Under threat from pseudo-science and technologies 
which are advancing faster than philosophies can accompany them, and in a grey zone of 
masqueraded ethical principles, the schools of thought that were once thought to be the 
omnipotent  cornerstones  of  the  scientific  institute  of  knowledge  are  now  doomed  to 
become historical relics. Increasing polarisation of rich versus poor, subsidised versus not, 
Impact Factor vs non-Impact Factor, paid-view versus open access, and a whole host of 
other  conflicting  concepts is  further  dividing  the  elite  minority  of  the  global  scientific 
community from its silenced majority. Awareness constitutes the first step on the road to 
constructive change. Shrouded in quasi-ignorance, scientists from Beijing to Belfast are 
fast being locked in a cycle that may revolutionise the world of science as we know it, 
blindly, but not painlessly. This small opinion paper is meant to be a nutcracker of sorts 
intended to initiate a cascade of counter-measures to stem the inevitable tide. 
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Note: Terms in bold italic type indicate new terms coined by the author for the purpose of 
enlightenment in this article. 
 
AN OVERVIEW 
 
The pillars of society have always redefined themselves over time, either in response to an 
inductive cue or naturally. A few centuries ago, one would have said that the religious institution and 
the state (synonymous to religion and the rule of law) would have constituted the two fundamental 
pillars of society despite its Jeffersonian separation [1]
__at least in the Western world, and possibly so 
within Islamic societies [2]. Law, religion, science and culture have always been the most influential 
driving factors in moulding societies, and whoever held a reign of power on any one of these
__even 
only  one
__would  most  likely  succeed  in  establishing  and  maintaining  a  strong  (hold  on)  society. 
However, unlike natural evolution, social change has been moulded almost exclusively by humans. 
As currency evolved from trading and bartering and postal mail evolved into e-mail and texting, so 
too  is  society  unrelentlessly  and  rapidly  evolving.  One  could almost say that human society has 
perhaps  evolved  much  more  over  the  past  10-20  years  than  it  has  in  the  past  century,  if  not 
millennium. Although this claim might be hotly disputed, the philosophical power struggle within and 
for modern society underlies the changes that science (and thus society) are now undergoing. A 
recent  socio-economic  and  political  assessment  of  China  considers  8  pillars  of  Chinese  society: 
emancipation of the mind; balancing top-down and bottom-up; framing the forest and letting the 
trees  grow;  crossing  the  river  by  feeling  the  stones;  artistic  and  intellectual  ferment;  joining the 
world;  freedom  and  fairness;  and  from  Olympic  medals  to  Nobel  prizes  [3],  although  a  close 
examination of these (as well as a conversation with the Chinese and a trip to China) would simply 
indicate that the id [4] Sinica, neo id or pluripotent ego is being enhanced with the purpose of 
capturing the attention of the world and perhaps much, much more. Kuran [5] tries to bring sense to 
the delay in the economic trend in the Middle East: “Islamic legal institutions, which had benefitted 
the Middle Eastern economy in the early centuries of Islam, began to act as a drag on development 
by slowing or blocking the emergence of central features of modern economic life including private 
capital accumulation, the corporation, large-scale production and impersonal exchange,” and “low 
trust, rampant corruption and weak civil societies
__all characteristic of the region’s economies today 
and all legacies of its economic history
__will take generations to overcome.” A profound assessment 
of  the  evolution  of  society  and  the  role  which  science  plays  in  that  process  would  be  almost 
impossible. Thus, this small viewpoint takes a broad look at how science has indeed become a power 
tool in the development and evolution of selected modern societies, independent of culture or creed. 
In their day-to-day survival mode, people tend to quickly forget how deeply their lifestyles 
are determined by, enveloped in, and to a certain extent controlled by science. To understand the 
depth of this link, one would have to step back and attempt to understand the definition of science. It 
would then be important to understand how science affects our everyday lives in real, tangible terms. 
Finally, through my personal interpretations, I wish to show how some sectors of society are strongly 
determined  by  science,  and  how  this  will  to  a  greater  extent  affect  all  scientists  and  ultimately 
members of society. This opinion paper will attempt to draw some of those links.    
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WHAT IS SCIENCE AND CAN IT BE CLEARLY DEFINED? 
 
Most likely many scientists would not be able to provide a concrete or succinct definition for 
the term ‘science’, and most likely the definition provided by a scientist would be quite different from 
that by a non-scientific member of society. Indeed, Gieryn [6] summed up the lack of demarcation 
between scientific thought and other intellectual activities: “Thus, ‘science’ is no single thing: its 
boundaries are drawn and redrawn flexible, historically changing and sometimes in ambiguous ways.” 
The demarcation of science may thus have been equivalent to defining what constitutes quality in 
science, pure or applied. A broad definition would indicate that science consists of a root system of 
knowledge bases or truth centres which have emerged from natural laws which themselves have 
become  established  from  pure  and  fundamental  trial  and  error.  Knowledge  in  its  purest  form 
constitutes science, as would be confirmed by its Latin equivalent, scientia. The ability to question an 
unknown and to attempt to discover the cause of its existence through explanations or predictions 
would be the defining of scientific principles. Being able to observe or identify, investigate, provide 
theoretical models and use different methodologies to prove or disprove theories would constitute 
the scientific methodology at the heart of science, although different schools of thought as briefly and 
broadly described next would attempt to dissect this basal truth. Much to Aristotle or Pliny’s horror, 
the outcome might not be necessarily logical or rational. Finally, being able to describe what has been 
challenged and observed constitutes one of the most important elements of the descriptive process 
underlining empirical science. Effective science writing has led to the historical chronicalisation of a 
fact, big or small, open to debate and dispute. The person who conducts science even as an art is a 
scientist or a scientific artist. 
More  simplistically  but  very  realistically,  science  is  everything and is in everything. Even 
religion is science and so is art, although not all religious persons or artists are or can be scientists 
(see brief notes on neo- or pseudo-cientistas later on).  
 
SCIENCE SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT: SURREAL GROUPING 
 
Empiricism is a philosophical state in epistemological science that claims that knowledge and 
understanding emerge from experience as perceived by the five senses through which experience 
leads  to  evidence,  as  obtained  through  methodological  experiments,  failure  and  success.  In  this 
school of thought, hypotheses and theories are established, and observations lead to concurrence or 
refutation of what was initially claimed. Markie [7] highlighted the differences between empiricism 
and rationalism (concept-based thinking) while another school of thought, pragmati(ci)sm, would 
most likely have tried to find common ground between the two, with Pierce claiming that rational 
concepts can be meaningful since their reach is beyond the data provided by empirical observation. 
Most likely what has set in in most laboratories around the world is a blend of Pierce’s three forms of 
reasoning (inductive, deductive and abductive), padded by logical empiricism and phenomenalism. 
The Rubik’s cube would be the Golden Triangle of empiricism, rationalism and pragmatism, being a 
finite combination of choices where six faces lead to only one end-point solution through a maze of 
6
6 permutations. How then can it satisfy the pluralistic basic that the empirical path of scientific 
thought is based on fallibilism (see next) where one choice would, in theory, tend to infinity? 
Pierce’s  approach  presupposes  that  (1)  the  objects  of  knowledge  are  real things, (2) the 
characters (properties) of real things do not depend on our perception of them, and (3) everyone  
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who has sufficient experience of real things will agree on the truth about them. According to Pierce’s 
doctrine of fallibilism, the conclusions of science are always tentative. The rationality of the scientific 
method does not depend on the certainty of its conclusions, but on its self-corrective character: by 
continued application of the method, science can detect and correct its own mistakes, and thus this 
eventually leads to the discovery of truth [8]. Popper’s critical rationalism rejects classical empiricism 
and its birth child, the classical observationalist-inductivist account of science. Popper believed that 
scientific theories, which are abstract in nature, can only be tested indirectly when their implications 
are  considered.  His  scientific  theory  claimed  that  human  knowledge  is  hypothetical,  based  on  a 
creative imagination in order to solve problems. Such an imagination would have emerged from 
socio-cultural settings [9-10].  
 
SCIENCE AND TRUTH: THERE IS NO UNIVERSAL TRUTH  
 
Once we have assumed that science or the study of science is empirical, this would mean that 
a  truth  is  always  open  to  questioning  or  falsification  (fallibilism).  That  means  that anything and 
everything that surrounds us might be false, or a questionable truth [11]. This might have evolved 
from the monism-dualism dichotomy. While the former claims unity in a field of inquiry, stemming 
most likely from Hinduistic beliefs [12], the latter provides two alternatives while pluralism would 
provide  multiple  alternatives.  In  ontological  dualism,  the  mind  (or  spirit)  and  matter  are 
disconnected. This fundamental dichotomy would allow a scientist to seek the truth if the scientist 
was disconnected from the spirit. Monists, however, feel that reality is constituted by one kind of 
substance and accordingly there is a potential causal interaction between any one segment of reality 
and another despite spiritual unity [13, 14]. In a state of dualism, it is possible that we do not have 
the capacity to extrapolate too much beyond what our senses perceive. So, to say that gravity does 
not hold objects down would be an inconceivable challenge to Galileo and difficult to comprehend, 
especially since, when we drop an apple, it does after all ‘fall down’. However, if we hold to our 
empirical definition of science, gravity does not exist, until proved. Since it was proved, it now 
remains to be disproved and perhaps re-proved once more; herein lies the essence of fallibilism. 
Popper [9], using the term ‘falsifiability’, claimed that if a theory cannot, in principle, be ‘falsified’ 
(i.e. refuted) by empirical data, then it is not scientific. In Popper’s logic, even if an infinite number 
of positive outcomes at the level of experimental testing can confirm a scientific theory, a single 
counterexample is logically decisive because it shows that that theory, from which the implication 
was derived, is false. The term ‘falsifiable’ does not mean, according to Popper, that something is 
false; rather, that if it is false, then this can be shown by observation or experiment. Darwin perceived 
theory as a necessary prerequisite of empirical investigation: “Without the making of theories I am 
convinced there would be no observation.” [15]. Marshall [16] quoted and endorsed Schmoller’s 
belief: “Induction and deduction are both needed for scientific thought as the left foot and the right 
foot are both needed for walking.” 
The proof of reality is a miracle of science and if sufficient evidence exists to support a claim, 
the  science  of  disproof  becomes  gradually  more difficult. Although such a challenge may sound 
ridiculous to some, it does constitute the basic fundamentals of science and its empirical lifeline. 
Extrapolated, not everything we see, hear or feel might be what we have been told it actually is. I 
would suspect that this might be hotly contested by a theologist, who would most likely challenge all  
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natural science beliefs with metaphysical interpretations. As we observe the scientific institutions that 
are now increasingly mastering the art of business science, we are forced to look beyond the crafted 
factors that impose quality and begin to erode away the empirical base of science. That discourse, 
despite its fundamental links, lies beyond the border of this opinion paper. 
 
SCIENCE AND HUMANS: THE PHILOSOPHICAL BARRIERS 
 
A few hundred years ago, the terms philosophy, science, philosophical science and natural 
philosophy might have been interchangeably used. Although there has now been a clearer artificial 
separation into the fields of natural science and philosophy, there is no doubt that all science requires 
philosophy, but not vice versa. Comte [17], in the evolutionary law of three stages, distinguished 
positive  science  from  metaphysics  and  theology  and  indicated  that  science  used  ‘reasoning  and 
observation’ to establish laws of ‘resemblance and succession.’ Consequently, not all philosophers 
need  be  scientists,  although  there  is a fundamental philosopher in each and every scientist. This 
article does not wish to delve too much into the details behind artificial categorisation of science, 
which can be examined or contested on Wikipedia, but will assume it in its broadest form. The 
empirical nature of science, namely the ability to observe, test and prove or dispute a phenomenon 
(natural, synthetic or unnatural) overrides the man-made divisions of natural and social sciences. 
There are different levels of scientific reasoning [18]: 1) the ontological level (assumptions about the 
nature  of  reality),  2)  the  epistemological  level  (how  knowledge  is  gained  and  justified),  3)  the 
heuristic level (how problems are framed), and 4) the methodological level (theoretical explanations 
and their construction). The classification into empirical or formal sciences thus also loses relevance 
in the broader discussion that follows. A factor explaining why the public at large might not be able 
to  appreciate  the  extent  or  importance  of  genetically  modified  organisms,  stem  cell  research  or 
cloning, for example, might be ontological dualism [18]. This is because the fundamental ability to 
assess facts underlying these fields of study might, purely and simply, not exist. In other words, 
scientific reasoning among the general public at one or all four levels simply does not exist or is 
hibernating. Despite this, most humans would follow a natural thought ontology: we live in a world 
of change; change leads to novelty and creativity leads to diversity, indispensable for socio-economic 
development [19]; novelty drives technological and institutional evolution, but because its nature is 
unpredictable [9] evolution is temporally unidirectional. Increasing ontological complexity involves 
causal interactions between several varied entities [20] which overall interact in a non-linear and 
chaotic way, further limiting predictability and creating the possibility of emergent properties and 
further novelties, often irreversible [21]. The ability to conceive, for example, that a transgenic plant 
might  contain  a  mixture  of  viral,  human  or  fish  genes  to  mass-produce  a  vaccine,  medicine  or 
nutrient might be philosophically impossible to assimilate if histological development had not been 
accompanied by ontological development alluded to by Pasteur: “...dans les champs de l’observation, 
le hasard ne favorise que les esprits préparés” (In the field of observation, chance favours only the 
prepared  mind)  [22],  hence  the  ravine  that  lies  between  science  and  society  and  their  inter-
comprehension.  
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SCIENCE AND CULTURE: WHERE IS THE SCIENTIFIC GARDEN OF EDEN?  
 
There is a somewhat misinformed perception that somehow science was born in Europe. To 
provide such a geographic starting point to the birth of science would be like saying the hamburger 
was invented or created in the USA simply by basing on its level of exposure or consumerism at that 
moment of time in history. To state that Science was born in the Renaissance or to father its birth on 
Pliny  or  Aristotle  would  be  no  less  than  a  humanitarian  and  historical  crime.  Science  owns  no 
mother, is not limited to any crib, nor is it cubed by the laws and restrictions that define quotidian 
lifestyles. Science as we know it may have had its origins in the first time a rock was struck against 
the other to create a spark. It may have begun when the sediment of salt water (salt) was added to 
food to create a new taste, or when a piece of wood was floated and could be used to carry humans 
or goods on both fresh and salt waters. Science may have begun when someone first remembered 
their dreams or when they first tried to understand their conflicts with fellow humans. Science has no 
owner, no origin, no path or destiny. Scientific thoughts and reasoning are held in the minds of 
humans and their clues and keys are tied up within nature. Pure, basic science involves the purest 
form of the quest for knowledge. Applied science would then recapitulate what was learnt in pure 
science in more ‘usable’ forms in a search for solutions to practical day-to-day problems. Applied 
science is not a modern concept at all and would have evolved hand-in-hand with pure science, 
although most likely with a tailing trail. The Neanderthal who struck the rocks and created the spark 
might have noted that his source of heat, light and possibly cooking instrument could be so easily 
extinguished by rain. 
Therefore, to attempt to doctor the birth of science, its value or its qualitative nature is a vile 
disregard of its origin and freedom. 
 
SCIENCE, LANGUAGE AND RELIGION: IS ENGLISH THE UNIVERSAL LANGUAGE OF 
SCIENCE? 
 
Without a doubt one of the most fundamental puzzles for humankind is how all sorts of life 
came to exist. However, the beauty of science is its ability to unify conflicting theories
__ evolutionary 
or religious. Religion, language and culture are inextricably interwoven and perhaps the modern day 
factors affecting this tapestry are technology and the Internet. Among English-speaking Western 
scientific  culture,  there  is  an  incredibly  gross  misconception  that  English  is  the  dominating  and 
universal language of science. Plato most definitely would not have agreed 16 centuries ago, and 
neither would have Boethius, Mendel or Pasteur. Fate would determine that the age of Christian and 
scientific discoveries would be played out among the European nations, leaving out other major 
religions such as Buddhism, Hinduism or Islam in their quest for expansion, only to culminate in the 
eventual global linguistic colonisation by Britain. Since then, English has become an overpowering 
force of communication and (regretted by some while convenient for others) the leading language for 
the communication of science. If it were not for the complexities of Chinese characters, Chinese 
might have been considered the linguistic tool that would accompany the neo-colonialisation now 
currently in progress, which would have added a 9th pillar to the Naisbitt and Naisbitt  theory [3]. 
However, to elevate achievements using only one language while marginalising others amounts to no 
less than a neo-usurpation of science of modern-era proportions and a refusal to consider cultural or 
linguistic background in a serious light, but rather as a dispensable ramification.  
Maejo Int. J. Sci. Technol.  2011, 5(01), S1-S10   
 
 
S7 
WHO OWNS SCIENCE, OWNS SOCIETY 
 
Rees [23] states, “progress in scientific understanding and technology have been synergistic 
and vital to one another.” When we open our fridge and forget to close the door, the detector that 
beeps  away  alarmingly  is  developed, thanks  to  science.  When  we  eat  yoghurt,  the  fermentation 
process and lactobacteria that lie therein that give better intestinal functioning are based on science. 
When we draw money from an ATM and balances, debits and credits are calculated in a split second 
or when bullish stocks bust on Wall Street in the time it takes to blink an eye-lid, all these and other 
economic,  currency  and  trading  variables  are  based  on  empirical  scientific  principles.  Even  the 
bleaching of hair, the miniaturisation of bonsai, or the separation of oil from water are based on 
scientific  facts.  Space,  the  final  frontier,  has  now become the new frontier between science and 
society. Who owns space or its access and the ability to survive there, owns a treasure chest to 
countless and boundless unknown wealth
__material or intellectual. A lifetime of effort and happiness 
lost  through  a  greed-filled  oil  spill  brought  about  by  poor  scientific  principles  and  saved  by 
oleophiles;  economies  destroyed  by  unstable  oil  prices,  unsteady  natural  reserves  and  political 
instability and stabilised by harnessing the power of the sun’s rays; the ability to create massive 
global social networks that can access and inform (or misinform) billions in the time it takes to click 
a mouse
__all of these, without exception, have fundaments in science. Pure science is used to explore 
and  discover.  Applied  science  is  used  to  perfect and expand. Open to use (and abuse), modern 
(>2010)  science  has  now  become  not  only  a  street-wise  tool,  but  a  kick-the-can  toy  for  the 
marketing world. 
In most of these cases, what we see and what is tangible have emerged from an empirical 
testing of experimental conditions, leading to a ‘techno-socio-eco-econo-logical’ development. The 
knowledge that may have underlain that science may have emerged from a sea of ignorance whose 
unknowns  required  correction  and  re-correction.  Such  an  explanation  would  feasibly  explain  a 
prototype and its subsequent improved versions: the iPod
® leading to the iPad
®. The hunger for 
filling that gap of knowledge or encroaching on the void of ignorance is no longer in the scientist, the 
image  of  a  bench-top  worker  and  laboratory-mongering,  coat-clad  person.  The  neo-cientista  or 
pseudo-cientista of the 21
st century has emerged as an average ‘Joe the plumber’ who is capable of 
seeking a market based on the thought-pattern and desire of consumers. Such an emergence of the 
neo-cientista  would  put  into  total  disarray  Gould’s  ideas  that  anyone  who  wants  to  become  a 
scientist  must  assume  the  uniformity  of  laws  and  processes  across  time  and  space  [24].  This 
abridging of empiricism and rationalism, with nuances of instrumentalism
__theories as instruments for 
explaining and predicting phenomena [25]
__held by ordinary men and women of society who are 
street-,  web-,  tech-  and  market-wise,  merits  a  new  term  in  the  school  of  thought  and  in  the 
philosophy of science. 
The  power  of  the  mass  media,  whether  tweeting  on  Twitter
®,  texting  on  Blackberries
®, 
scrolling down on iPads
®, posting on YouTube
®, linking socially on Facebook
® or scientifically on 
Linkd
®, is posing an existential threat to the very basis of the core concepts of science and scientists, 
threatening  theories  that  have  held  for  centuries.  The  power  of  mass-data  collection  on 
megacomputers  or  an  expanded  www2  is  challenging  the  limits  of  puritan  scientific  thought, 
relegating  scientific  philosophy  to  ‘gutter  thinking’  and  elevating  pseudo-science,  fringe  or  junk 
science [26] to Nobel-level hype. Within science publishing itself, the freedom to choose between  
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rigorously reviewed journals and those that literally publish on submission is feeding the neo-culture 
of pseudo-science. When simplistic confirmation substitutes refutation, neo- or pseudo-cientistas 
grip  comforting  beliefs,  overgeneralise  and  seek  thought-unifying  gratitude through ‘YouTubian’ 
resemblances rather than empirical cause-effect thinking. 
Without a doubt and without exception, science affects the way we live our day-to-day life. 
Science stares society in the face from dawn to dusk. Science affects the way in which societies 
function (or to some extent determines their dysfunctional patterns), and the entities who hold the 
keys to science will be (already are?) the forces of social and political empowerment of the future. 
Publishing companies who hold copyright on millions of papers of intellectual achievements and who 
charge for their access are artful masters of the science chess game at the expense of only one entity: 
the scientist. Such media giants or possible government agencies may begin a trend in which science 
begins to slip from the hands of the creators, the true scientists, into the hands of the wrong entities, 
independent of culture or geographic barrier. Such a power play of science would certainly result in a 
historical rift between those that believe and those that do not, and between those that have and 
those that do not
__not too unlike the social barrier that once defined medieval societies. What if those 
entities begin to determine what is good or bad science, what is ethical and unethical science, and 
what is open or closed science? We must then begin to question who owns science and what power 
is held within that science, or within society. To slip into a new era of scientific ownership is to 
enslave science itself and to deprive it from the freedom to question, explore and express the findings 
that the science forefathers would have liked to see, and see being expressed. To give it incorrect 
ownership,  independent  of  correct  accreditation  and  acknowledgement,  is  to  doom  science  to  a 
historical relic and to take one step back in the evolution of humankind. 
Who owns science does own society, or at least is beginning to do so. That ownership needs 
to be re-evaluated and carefully monitored, assessed and addressed. 
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